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Recent literature points to a relationship between inequality, economic growth and 
socio-economic variables.  In order to continue to research the relationship 
between these factors and inequality in Colombia, it is essential to construct a 
precise measure of rural land distribution.  This paper presents calculations of rural 
land size and land value Gini coefficients for Colombia at the national, departmental 
and municipal levels using approximately 2.5 million registries of plot level data 
supplied by the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi.  In general, value Ginis, 
where value controls for land quality and improvements, are lower than plot size 
Ginis, and even after meticulous filtration anomalies remain in the data.     
Additionally, the relationship between the Gini coefficients and municipal level 
variables are analyzed to consider the relation between inequality, poverty, rurality 
and other municipal characteristics.  Lastly, earlier results relating Gini to violence 
are reconsidered.  After controlling for other factors, distribution does not explain 
significantly violence. 
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        DISTRIBUCIÓN DE LA TIERRA RURAL AGRÍCOLA AL NIVEL            
              NACIONAL, DEPARTAMENTAL Y MUNICIPAL EN COLOMBIA:       
             UN ANÁLISIS DE LA MARAÑA DE POBREZA, DESIGUALDAD Y  




La literatura reciente indica una relación entre desigualdad, crecimiento económico 
y variables socio-económicas.  Para continuar la investigación de la relación entre 
estos factores y la desigualdad en Colombia, es esencial construir una medida 
precisa de la distribución de la tierra rural.  Este trabajo presenta los cálculos de 
los coeficientes de Gini de tierra y avalúo catastral para Colombia al nivel nacional, 
departamental, y municipal usando aproximadamente 2.5 millones de registros de 
datos al nivel del predio con información suministrada por el Instituto Geográfico 
Agustín Codazzi.  En general, los Gini de avalúo catastral, donde el avalúo controla 
por diferencias en la calidad de tierra y mejoramientos, son menores a los Gini de 
tierra, y después de una meticulosa filtración de datos siguen existiendo anomalías 
en los mismos.  Adicionalmente, se analiza la relación entre el coeficiente Gini y 
variables municipales para considerar la relación entre desigualdad, pobreza, 
ruralidad y otras características municipales.  Finalmente, se reconsideran algunos 
resultados previos referentes a la relación entre la distribución de la tierra y la 
violencia.  Después de controlar por otros factores, se encuentra que la distribución 
no explica la violencia. 
 
Palabras claves: Coeficiente Gini, pobreza, ruralidad y violencia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Colombia, previous measures of the Gini coefficient have generally been 
calculated only at the national or departmental level and based on cadastre data 
summaries supplied by the Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (IGAC).  Recently 
obtained 2002 IGAC cadastre data, plot level information supplied with state-
assessed land value and owner information, permits the calculation of both land 
size and land value Gini coefficients for land plots at the national, departmental and 
municipal level.   
 
Land distribution has policy relevance for myriad reasons, and recent literature has 
found increasing evidence to conclude a relationship between inequality and lower 
poverty reduction rates and lower levels of economic growth.  Without precise 
estimates of actual land distribution, reaching conclusions about these 
relationships within Colombia would be impossible.  This paper represents an 
attempt at presenting a detailed analysis of national, departmental and municipal 
land and land value Gini coefficients, and, at the municipal level, considering the 
relationship between inequality and other municipality characteristics.   The Gini is 
related to municipal level variables by quintiles and a reduced form regression.  
Also, particular attention is given to the relationship between land distribution and 
violence.  The paper reconsiders earlier results that suggested land inequality 
positively explained municipal violence levels.   
 
The paper is divided into the following sections.  Section 2 reviews the recent 
literature concerning the effects of inequality and previous measures of inequality 
in Colombia.  Section 3 presents the methodology for calculating the Gini 
coefficient and the national, departmental and municipal land size and land value   4
Ginis, respectively.  Section 4 discusses the impact of administrative updating 
(actualización del catastro) on Gini values, and Section 5 relates land distribution 
to municipal characteristics.  Several reduced form regressions are presented to 
explore the relationship between Gini, poverty, rurality and violence.  The final 
section concludes. 
 
2. Inequality in recent literature 
 
The measurement of inequality plays a key role in establishing the validity of recent 
work regarding the importance of income distribution, growth and poverty 
reduction.  Inequality levels have been associated with economic growth, future 
poverty reduction, formation of human capital, investment, access to credit and 
violence.   
 
According to Bourguignon (2002), higher levels of economic growth are clearly 
associated with higher poverty reduction levels, and in countries with less 
inequality, income growth is converted into greater poverty reduction than in 
countries with more income inequality.  Worsening the problem of the 
impoverished, growth is more difficult in countries with higher levels of inequality.  
Bouguignon concludes that policies that help to permanently redistribute income 
lower poverty and, additionally, contribute to an acceleration in poverty reduction at 
a given level of economic growth.  
 
Although debate still exists over the impact of inequality and economic growth, at 
the moment most work has supported the position that higher levels of income or 
asset inequality are causally related to lower levels of income growth.  Two 
important reasons behind this result are that inequality affects investment   5
opportunities, causing inefficiencies and limiting potential returns, and that elites 
may have on the political economy.  In the case of the latter, powerful elites choose 
public policy strategies that benefit themselves while harming others. 
 
Given that land represents an important asset when measuring rural household 
wealth, and that distribution plays an important role in growth and development, an 
accurate measure of rural land distribution is necessarily valuable.  Using land 
distribution as a proxy, Deininger and Squire (1998) show that the level of asset 
inequality has a significant impact on a country’s economic growth.  They explore 
the possibility of a systematic relationship between initial inequality and 
subsequent economic growth and find that the existence of inequality in assets has 
a negative and significant impact on economic growth.  This suggests that high 
levels of land concentration will affect credit or investment, limit the formation of 
human capital and affect levels of  violence.   
 
Evidence suggests that inequality tends to worsen poverty due to its relationship 
with economic growth and the dispersion of its benefits.  In this way, studies that 
analyze causal factors of poverty often consider inequality as an important 
component in explaining poverty levels.  In Colombia, various authors have 
attempted to link poverty to macroeconomic, violence and socio-economic 
indicators.  Measurements of inequality play an important role in this literature, at 
both the household and municipal level. 
 
Carrizosa (1981, 1986) in his analysis of CEDE and DANE
2 surveys associates 
poverty with household and household head characteristics.  In his first study, he 
                                                 
2 Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico at the Universidad de los Andes and the 
governmental agency, the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística.   6
finds that the poor tend to have fewer years of education and more dependents, 
but the effects of age and location were not significant.  His later study, with more 
recent surveys, finds the same effects for education and that rurality negatively 
impacts poverty.  May (1996) in his study of poverty in Colombia finds similar 
results.  The probability of being poor is higher for rural households, and poor 
households tend to have less education and fewer working household members. 
 
Also at the household level, Nuñez and Ramirez (2002) analyze the characteristics 
of poor households.  In addition to finding differences between rural and urban 
areas, where rural areas are poorer, they observe that poor households had, on 
average, more household members, were younger and had less education than 
non-poor.  At the macroeconomic level, Nuñez and Ramirez (2002) find that 
unemployment and inflation increase poverty while improvements in labor 
productivity reduce it.  They also show that during the 1990s income inequality, at 
a national level, had a positive impact on poverty (greater inequality, more 
poverty).   
 
In an effort to analyze the relationship between development and geographical 
characteristics, Sanchez and Nuñez (2002) relate geographic characteristics at the 
municipal level to per capita income, per capita income growth and municipal 
inequality.  They find that the geographical variables (soil quality, water availability, 
etc.) affect municipal income and growth, and distance to principal markets and soil 
quality were the most significant.  Furthermore, in the poorest municipalities, 
geographical variables are more significant, explaining more of the variation in 
income and growth in per capita income. 
   7
Violence in Colombia has also been explained by factors associated with 
inequality.  In general, studies that analyze violence in Colombia take into account 
the historical trends and relate violence to economic and regional variables, where 
violence can be associated with guerrilla groups, paramilitaries or common 
criminals.  A driving question in many of these studies is relationship between 
crime and the guerrilla and paramilitary groups.  If the formation of these groups, 
and their consequences on civil order and economic variables, is related to poverty 
and inequality levels, then the problem of inequality becomes an important aspect 
in the resolution of the armed conflict. 
 
Bourguignon, Nuñez and Sanchez (2003) consider the problem of the possible 
relationship between crime rates and various indicators of inequality.  Looking at a 
specific part of the income distribution in order to explain property crimes, they find 
that unemployment and the income Gini affect crime in Colombia’s seven principal 
cities. 
 
In the existing literature, mainly focusing on Colombia, an interdependent and 
circular relationship between poverty, inequality, violence and growth has been 
suggested.  Bourguignon (2002) finds that inequality has a negative impact in 
reducing poverty.  Nuñez and Ramirez (2002) establish that inequality positively 
affects poverty, and Bourguignon, Nuñez and Sanchez (2003) demonstrate that 
income distribution can affect crime rates.  Querubin (2003) concludes that growth 
is negatively affected by violence.  The evidence suggests a need to resolve the 
problems of poverty and inequality to alleviate violence and increase growth. 
   8
3. Calculating the Gini  
 
The Gini coefficient is one form of measuring inequality.  The index varies between 
zero and one, where zero is a perfectly equal distribution (of land) and one 
indicates that all of the (land) assets are held by a single person.  The land Gini 
coefficient measures the inequality in land holdings or land values, assuming one 
owner per plot. 
 
According to Deaton (1997), two methods for calculating the Gini exist, direct and 
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In the indirect method, first a Lorenz curve is constructed, with the cumulative 
percent of land on the vertical axis, and the cumulative percent of population on the 
horizontal axis.  The 45 degree line represents perfect equality and the Gini 
coefficient is defined as the ratio between the area between the Lorenz Curve and 
the 45 degree line and the triangular area that represents perfect equality.  In this 
case the formula can be expressed as:  
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 where Lj represents the cumulative percent of land in j and Nj is the cumulative 
percent of owners in j. 
 
The Gini coefficient was calculated at the national, departmental and municipal 
levels using individual plot areas and their values.  Values are assigned by the 
government for taxation purposes and depend on location and physical 
characteristics of the plot.  In order to calculate the Ginis with the 2002 rural land 
cadastre data supplied by the IGAC, a filtration process was carried out in order to 
eliminate non-rural (urban) plots, state owned land and tribal reserves:
3  T h e  
complete dataset prior to filtration contained approximately 2.8 million registries 
with approximately 3.8 million registered owners.  
 
Each plot in the data includes information on the owner or multiple owners, 
physical characteristics, such as plot size and improvements, and the cadastre 
values assigned to the land plot by the municipality and the IGAC.  Updated 
cadastre information is reported to the IGAC by the municipality at intervals 
between five and 40 years.  Updating provides the IGAC with information on 
changes in ownership through sale, inheritance or land reform, and it includes 
newly assessed land values based on current market conditions or land 
improvements. 
 
3.1 National rural Gini  
 
After carrying out the data filtration, the first land and land value Gini coefficients 
calculated were at the national level.   Table 1 describes the filtration criteria 
                                                 
3 It should also be noted that the catastro (cadastre or land registry) information excludes the 
department of Antioquia, and the cities of Bogotá and Calí.  The latter two are mainly urban, so do 
not represent a significant loss for the rural Gini at the national level.  Also, the IGAC maintains rural 
and urban cadastre databases.   10
presents the national Gini coefficient for land size and land value.  The drop in the 
Gini due to the filtration process emphasizes the importance of analyzing plots by 
ownership characteristics, and excluding areas not germane to the analysis.  The 
lower land value Gini is expected since the cadastre value should take into account 
land quality and other improvements that size alone will not capture.   
 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the land Gini is always higher than the value, consistent 
with the hypothesis that taking into account land quality improves land distribution.  
The raw data from IGAC produces a land Gini of 92.69 and value Gini of 82.99.  
Each additional filter includes the previous, and the biggest drop is observed with 
the elimination of state owned property.  The summation across individuals shows 
the impact of summing across individuals who own more than one plot.  If an 
individual owns more than one plot anywhere in the country, the areas of the plots 
are summed together.  The slight drop in the land Gini suggests that owners of 
multiple plots have small sized holdings instead of large ranches in various parts of 
the country.  To consider the impact of possible data entry errors outliers were 
eliminated.  The criteria of 1 centavo (one-hundredth of a peso) per hectare and 
$10 million pesos per square meter were established as “impossible” values, and 
any plots whose value lied below or above these values were eliminated.  The 
effect on the national Gini was actually quite small. 
 
Concerning the tendency toward land concentration, the Gini “across individuals” 
reveals that, in general, large landholders do not hold many plots under the same 
name.  If the hypothesis of land concentration during the 1980s and 1990s is to be 
true, the owners are either swapping smaller plots for bigger ones, integrating 
smaller plots into larger plots and re-titling the land as a single property, or simply 
registering plots under different names.  The former two possibilities seem unlikely,   11
and the third can not be measured by the Gini.  For these reasons, it will be 
difficult, if not impossible, to use the Gini as a measure of changes in land 
concentration levels, as some authors have suggested (see Machado (1998)). 
 
Although multiple plots owned by a single individual were summed across owners 
in the “Across owner” Ginis, a fundamental issue to recall when interpreting the 
Gini at the national, departmental and municipal levels is that many plots have 
multiple owners.  The Gini treats plots held by multiple-owners as if owned by a 
single individual.  This gives an upward bias to the Gini estimations, and Table 2 
demonstrates that the biggest plots have the largest number of owners per plot.  In 
the top centile, plots have nearly two owners per plot, suggesting that the impact of 
multiple-owners may cause significant overestimation of the Gini.  The cadastre 
data contains information on owner names, but it does not include percentages in 
order to properly assign land to each individual owner.    As a result, the Gini 
ignores multiple-ownership and treats multiply-owned plots as single-ownership. 
 
Comparing the present estimates to earlier estimates of rural land Gini coefficients, 
the filtration results in noticeably lower values for the land Gini, but higher for land 
value.   Machado (1998) presents a national land Gini coefficient for Colombia of 
0.88 in 1996 and 0.85 in 1984.  Although he suggests this may indicate a tendency 
toward land concentration, as seen above the Gini across individuals does not 
show this effect and data filtration may account for these changes. 
 
Castaño (1999), using truncated summaries of the IGAC data, calculates a national 
rural land Gini for Colombia of 0.84 and a land value Gini of 0.60 for 1996..  The 
data summaries used by Castaño (1999) in her calculations only include the 
number of rural plots, land owners, total area and total land value in 13 asymmetric   12
land ranges from, for 1 to 3 hectares and 1000 to 2000 hectares.  Even though the 
land Gini is quite similar to the estimate obtained using the plot level data, her 
value Gini underestimates the plot level Gini by approximately 30%. 
 
3.2 Departmental Gini  
 
The detail of the IGAC information extends the analysis of Gini coefficients beyond 
previous estimates in the existing literature.  Table 3 presents the land and value 
Ginis with their differences and the area of land represented in the calculation.  The 
average value of the departmental Ginis drops below the national level, but the 
value Gini still does not reach earlier measures using truncated data.   
 
One important difference between the national and departmental Ginis is that, on 
average, the value Gini is actually higher than the land Gini.  To understand this 
result, we consider the percent of total land represented in the Gini calculation and 
the size of the rural population.  It becomes clear that in some of the most rural 
municipalities the land included in the calculation is lowest. For example, the 
municipalities with the largest negative difference between Gini land and value 
(Caquetá, Guainia, Guaviare and Vichada) have among the highest levels of rural 
population and the smallest percent of land included in the calculation (15.45%, 
0.004%, 2.11% y 14.11%, respectively). This may occur due to lower levels of land 
titling in the most rural areas.  Since the Ginis are estimated using cadastre data, 
the non-titled land does not enter the calculation. 
 
Considering a smaller group of departments, including in the departmental Gini 
averages only departments whose percent land included exceeds 25% of total 
land, the sign of the average difference changes.  Once again, the expected result 
of a lower land value Gini is obtained (land Gini 77.08 and value Gini 75.46 for 20   13
departments, see Table 3).  We observe the same tendency increasing the cut-off 
point to 50% of total land.  Although the difference between land and value Ginis is 
much lower than previous studies, in general land Ginis are lower and the percent 
of total area included affects Gini values.  
 
3.3 Municipal Gini 
 
In the calculation of the Gini at the municipal level, we face a tradeoff between 
homogeneity of data, in terms of actualization and land value assessment, and the 
drop in the size of the comparative universe.  The land and value Ginis reveal the 
same trends found at the national and departmental levels, with municipal Ginis 
being lower.   
 
Given the large number of municipalities included in the data (942 of 1,087), 
histograms are a convenient means of presenting the municipal land and value 
Ginis.  The histogram in Figure 1 compares the land and value Ginis for 942 
municipalities and demonstrates the same tendency toward lower value Ginis.  The 
average land and value municipal Ginis are 68.24 and 66.53, respectively, 
considerably lower than the national and departmental Ginis. 
 
Another advantage of the municipal Gini is that it allows for more in-depth analysis 
of possible measurement problems or anomalies in the data that do not appear or 
are more difficult to identify at the national or departmental level.   To consider this 
aspect of the data, two “top ten” tables are presented.  Table 4 presents the ten 
highest municipal land Ginis and Table 5 over representation. 
   14
The ten highest municipal land Ginis reveal that even after filtration suspicious 
patterns persist.  The highest land Gini in Table 5 is 98.36, a Gini that suggests 
one plot makes up the majority of the rural area in the municipality.  Eliminating 
outliers, whose criteria is the elimination of plots with a value of less than one-
hundredth of a peso (centavo) or greater than $10 million pesos per square meter, 
the two highest municipal Ginis drop to ranges approximating the national average.  
Concerning the other municipalities, the question of representativity arises again.  
In the filtered data base, on average, there are 2,414.17 registered plots per 
municipality and 3,423.54 owners.  Several of the highest municipal land Ginis 
have far fewer plots than the average number of owners and plots.  Also, the 
impact of counting multiple owners as single owners becomes apparent in the 
highest Ginis.  In some of these ten municipalities there are more than 1.5 owners 
per plot.  The Gini does not take into account multiple-owners, possibly worsening 
the calculated level of land distribution.  Finally, in several cases the percentage of 
total area represented in the data is quite low while the rural population is quite 
high.  This suggests that a small fraction of the rural land is actually included in the 
rural land Gini. 
 
A further concern that arises upon studying the municipal data is the overall level of 
representativity of the areas.  There are 99 municipalities in which the sum of the 
filtered area is greater than the area of the municipality itself.  The ten highest 
cases of over-representation are presented in Table 5.  In the worst case, the 
filtered area represents 2,899% of the total municipal area, casting doubt on the 
measured sizes of the plots and the accuracy of the Ginis.  This table also shows 
that some municipalities with poorly reported plot size have  large differences 
between the land and value Ginis.  
   15
Table 6 summarizes the land and value Gini coefficients at the national, 
departmental and municipal levels.  The filtration of Ginis leads to an approximately 
8% drop at the national level.  The effect of filtering the data is greatest at the 
departmental level where the difference between the filtered Ginis and unfiltered 
Ginis approaches 15%. 
 
4. The actualization of the cadastre and the Gini
4 
 
Actualization of the cadastre influences the Gini calculation through the frequency 
in which updated information is sent to the IGAC and the estimated values of the 
plots.  According to the 1991 Constitution (Article 287), the municipalities are 
authorized to administer their own resources and collect the necessary taxes for 
development programs.  Similarly, Law 44 of 1990 established the tax framework 
for generating the funds for updating the cadastre information.   
 
The creation of the cadastre registries entails three processes at the municipal 
level.  The first phase is the formation of the cadastre, which includes the collection 
of data on physical, economic and legal variables.  The second aspect is the 
actualization, which consists of periodic updating of information contained in the 
cadastre.  Finally, conservation takes into account changes or “mutations” that 
individual plots may undergo.  In addition, the municipalities update information on 
land value annually, used in the collection of the plot tax, according to a percent 
value established by the national government.  By law, the municipalities should 
actualize the cadastre at least every five years.   
 
                                                 
4 Some portions of this section rely on information from Offstein, Hillon and Caballero (2003).   16
Unfortunately, in many municipalities actualization of the cadastre occurs less 
frequently than every five years because the process is costly and municipalities 
must appropriate their own funds to carry-out the process.  Although there may be 
potential gains in tax collection and the IGAC offers professionals to assist in the 
actualization process, some municipalities have not updated the rural cadastre 
since the 1950s. 
 
A summary of annual actualization by year in Table 7 indicates that at times 
actualization lagged more than 40 years for some municipalities.  The year column 
reports the year of the actualization information, and the year with the longest 
average actualization lag is 1989 with an 11.1 year lag.  During the 1990s the 
average lag drops, revealing an effort on the part of the national government to 
update the cadastre, in keeping with the new Constitution of 1991 and related laws.  
Nonetheless, several municipalities (various in the department of Nariño) have not 
actualized the rural cadastre since the 1950s. 
 
Lags in the actualization of the cadastre affect both the land and value Ginis.  In 
the case of the former, an outdated cadastre does not permit the observation of 
changes in land ownership or division of plots through land reform programs.  Even 
though the IGAC data for calculating the Ginis is 2002, the plot level information is 
only as recent as the last cadastre actualization.  In the case of municipalities that 
have undergone land reform programs and have not actualized, the land Gini will 
overestimate inequality.  For the value Gini, the land value reported in the cadastre 
information will not reflect changes in the market values of the plots, due to 
improvements, population growth, etc.  Without actualization, the consumer price 
index is used to adjust values, and this may not reflect shifts in the land market.   
   17
To consider the impact of the actualization on the Gini, Figure 2 presents average 
land Gini values by actualization year and the 95% confidence interval around the 
Gini average.  The land Gini averages and the confidence intervals show much 
greater variation prior to 1989.  In earlier years, the confidence interval collapses 
for years with only one observation.  Figure 2 indicates that actualization plays an 
important role in the standard deviation of the land Gini estimates, which should 
lead to doubts about the reliability of Ginis from municipalities that have not 
actualized in the past 15 years.  Furthermore, the actualization problems mean that 
it is not possible to think of a national Gini for a given point in time.  Even though 
the data for the Gini calculation comes from the 2002 IGAC database, the 
estimated Gini is inter-temporal due to heterogeneity in actualization. 
 
In an attempt to test if the land Ginis are significantly different due to actualization 
year,  
Table 8 presents the results from t-tests on mean differences for average land Gini 
values.  The land Gini values were averaged according to year of actualization, 
and using 2002 as a base a t-test for differences in means was carried out on each 
of the years in the table.  No clear upward or downward temporal tendency 
appears in terms of average land Gini values, but for some years the averages are 
significantly different.   
 
5. The Gini and municipal characteristics  
 
After the calculation of the Gini, one of the primary goals is understanding the 
relationship between land inequality and other economic and socio-economic 
variables.  As mentioned earlier, an important literature has developed around the 
impact of land distribution on growth and social cohesion, where the latter has   18
been argued to influence violence and civil conflicts.  Higher inequality has also 
generally been associated with higher poverty levels. 
 
There is undoubtedly interest in directly relating economic and socio-economic 
variables with the Gini in order to better understand the connection between 
inequality and economic and development indicators.  The challenge with a 
regression based approach attempting to explain the Gini is causality or 
simultaneity.  Estimated parameters of the regression may be inconsistent.  In an 
effort to relate the Gini to municipal-level characteristics, two strategies are 
implemented.  First, a municipal level quintile table is presented to consider the 
relationship between the land and value Ginis and aspects of rurality, poverty and 
violence.  Second, a subset of variables whose simultaneity may be less 
problematic is selected to carry out linear regressions explaining land and value 
Ginis.  
 
Table 9 relates the municipal land and value Ginis quintiles to four categories of 
municipal characteristics.  To simplify the interpretation of the relationship between 
municipal variables and the Gini quintiles, each of the municipal level variables 
were normalized by subtracting the mean.  The average of each quintile whose 
value is less than the mean will be negative, and positive in the opposite case.  
When an increasing or decreasing pattern exists across quintiles, the values of the 
averages will be increasing or decreasing.  Increasing and decreasing relationships 
are highlighted in bold in Table 9. 
 
In general, the land Gini presents more clear relationships (strictly increasing or 
decreasing) than the value Gini.  This may occur as a result of the variation in 
cadastre actualization year which affects the reported plot values.  The t-statistics   19
report the level of significance of the difference between the first and fifth quintile.  
Even though many variables do not present clear negative or positive patterns 
across all five quintiles, many of the differences in average values between the top 
and bottom quintiles are significant, suggesting significant differences in municipal 
characteristics depending on the Gini. 
 
The first category, municipal characteristics, includes rurality and infrastructure 
indicators.  Clear trends can be observed in distance to principal markets (greater 
distance, lower Gini), road density (fewer roads, lower Gini), and value of rural 
plots (lower value, lower Gini).  The direction of the trends suggests that the 
municipalities that are farther from the principal markets, with fewer kilometers of 
roads, and lower cadastre land values have lower Ginis, indicating that the more 
isolated or rural municipalities have more equal land distribution.  The negative 
relationship between distance to principal markets and Gini was also found by 
Sanchez and Nuñez (2002). 
 
Among the variables included in municipal characteristics are municipal spending 
patterns, in order to consider whether or not land inequality alters municipal level 
investment decisions.  Some portion of municipal spending is dictated by law 
(forced) while municipalities also choose to spend some resources freely (free 
spending).  The combined municipal spending (forced + free) per capita in 2000 
does not present a pattern, but does have a significant difference between the first 
and last quintile.  “Free” spending on investment (voluntary municipal investment 
as opposed to forced investment required by law) as a percent of total free 
spending shows a positive trend in the value Gini, meaning that municipalities with 
lower value Ginis choose to spend more on investment.  This result raises the 
possibility that land inequality affects municipal spending decisions.   20
 
In terms of violence indicators, quintiles suggest that municipalities with more equal 
land distribution tend to suffer from more guerrilla actions and more kidnappings.  
Given that the Gini is an inter-temporal measure due to the different actualization 
years, the violence indicators were taken as averages over the period of available 
data.  ELN actions and kidnappings present clear tendencies: in municipalities with 
more equal land distribution, there occur more kidnappings and ELN activity per 
capita.  The inverse relationship between guerrilla action and inequity contradicts 
the traditional hypothesis that more inequity should lead to higher levels of 
violence.  This result may not be surprising if it is assumed that profit motivates 
guerrilla actions, where activity simply occurs in more rural areas that happen to 
have more equal land distribution. 
 
The poverty variables, as a group, show the clearest directional relationship among 
all the variable groups.  The NBI, or necesidades básicas insatisfechas, measures 
the percent of the population in the municipality that does not have “basic needs” 
met, and the rural NBI is only for the rural segment of the population.  Similarly, the 
misery measure counts the percent of people in the municipality living in conditions 
of misery.  For both NBI and misery, lower Ginis are associated with more persons 
in these conditions.  The same pattern presents itself in measures of water, 
sewage and phone services outside the municipal head.  The last variable in this 
category, the poverty factor, is a poverty indicator constructed using principal 
factors to capture combined aspects of rurality and poverty.  The factor is 
composed of two variables indicating service levels (educational infrastructure and 
health centers and hospitals per capita), and several variables included in the 
calculation of the NBI, as percent of the population outside the municipal head.  
Among the latter are percent of housing without basic amenities, percent of   21
persons lacking services, percent of persons in overcrowded conditions, percent of 
scholastic absenteeism, and percent of persons living as dependents.  Just as the 
other measures of poverty, the poverty factor suggests that municipalities with 
lower Ginis present higher poverty levels.  The quintile analysis suggests that the 
municipalities that suffer from poverty and violence are the more rural 
municipalities with more equal land distribution. 
 
Based on the above results, a few variables were chosen to carry out a reduced 
form regression to explain the variation in the municipal land and value Ginis.  The 
simplest specifications, models (1) and (5) in Table 10, attempt to include only 
variables that are the most likely to be exogenous.  Variables included in the 
regression, that presumably are not affected by changes in the Gini, are two 
rurality indicators (distance to principal markets and distance to Bogotá), a poverty 
measure (NBI from 1973) and two physical characteristics (altitude and municipal 
area), and regional dummies.  In addition, the regression controls for possible fixed 
effects for actualization year and includes only municipalities that actualized the 
cadastre in 1989 or later, taking into consideration the confidence intervals 
discussed earlier. 
 
Supposing a positive relationship between inequality, poverty and rurality, 
estimated parameters on these coefficients should be positive and significant.  In 
fact, the signs on the poverty and rurality coefficients in the various specifications 
agree with the patterns observed in the municipal level land and value quintile 
analysis.  The rurality measures have negative signs, indicating that the 
municipalities that are farther from the capital and farther from principal markets 
tend to have more equal land distribution.  The negative and significant sign on 
1973 NBI suggests that the more equally distributed municipalities face higher   22
levels of unmet basic needs, for both the land and value Ginis.  Overall, the simple 
specifications explaining land and value Ginis demonstrate a negative relationship 
between inequality, poverty and rurality. 
 
To consider the possibility that less equal land distribution has affected poverty 
reduction in municipalities with higher land and value Ginis, the 1973 NBI is 
replaced with the change in NBI (NBI 1985 minus NBI 1973), regressions (2) and 
(4) in Table 10.  In the municipalities where the percent of households facing NBI 
has decreased, the difference in NBI will be negative.  The negative and significant 
coefficient on the NBI difference in both the land and value regressions implies that 
the municipalities that have made progress in reducing the NBI are those with 
higher land inequality. 
 
The models (3), (4), (7) and (8) in Table 10 introduce additional variables that more 
likely generate endogeniety problems.  Supposing that these variables are 
exogenous, the violence indicator number of ELN attacks per capita is not 
significant in either the land or value regression and road density has a positive 
and significant sign, in keeping with the results in Table 9.  The significant and 
positive coefficient on rural plot value suggests that municipalities whose land 
values are higher have greater inequality, once again confirming the negative 
relationship between Gini and rurality. 
 
5.1 Gini and violence 
 
Previous studies have presented arguments attempting to develop a causal 
relationship between levels of land inequality and violence, an issue of particular 
importance for Colombia given that it possesses among the highest levels of   23
violence throughout Latin America (and the world).  The suggestion is that higher 
land inequality will worsen social polarization and weaken the consensus for policy 
changes or other non-violent reform.  Thus, the less-fortunate are more willing to 
join illegal armed groups and escalate violence (World Bank (2003)). 
 
This argument was previously tested using data from Los Andes and a reduced 
form specification, and the results indicated that higher levels of violence are 
positively and significantly affected by the land Gini.
5  Other explanatory variables 
included in the model are population density, distance to Bogotá, and road density, 
where the first two are generally positive and significant and the latter negative and 
less significant.  The signs and significance levels of the coefficients on land Ginis 
help drive the conclusion that high levels of land inequality play an important role in 
determining municipal violence levels. 
 
These results raise an interesting difference between some civil conflict literature 
and literature specifically analyzing the Colombian violence.  The former has 
associated violence with social inequality (Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and 
Deininger (2003)), while the latter tends to explain violence as a result of 
profiteering, illicit crop cultivation, opportunities for extortion or battles for transit 
corridors (Sanchez, Diaz, and Formisano (2003); Diaz and Sanchez (2003); 
Sanchez and Nuñez, (2001)).
6   
 
Further, the municipal land and value Ginis analyzed by quintiles in Table 9 and 
the reduced form regression explaining Ginis in Table 10 also tend to deviate from 
                                                 
5 See Colombia: land policy in transition, Table 1.6 p.16, World Bank (2003) or “Colombia: una 
política de tierras en transición,” Table 1.4, p.23, Documento CEDE, No. 29, Universidad de los 
Andes, August 2004. 
6 Sanchez and Nuñez (2001) present an extended discussion of the debate about the causes of 
violence and their application to the Colombian case.   24
the aforementioned violence regression results.  One possibility is that the 
regressions finding a positive relationship between Gini and violence could suffer 
from omitted variables problems.  The quintile findings presented earlier indicate 
that Gini and poverty appear to be linked.  Including a more direct measure of 
poverty may help explain the finding that greater land inequality increases violence.  
In addition, following the result that rurality is associated with Gini, rurality is also 
controlled for.  Finally, based on the argument that violence stems from activities 
associated with illegal activity, area of coca plants is included as an indicator of 
illicit enterprises. 
 
The construction of the regressions supposes that violence in the municipalities 
depends on land distribution, rurality and criminality.  Including poverty and rurality 
variables along with the Gini is fundamental in controlling for these other factors 
and establishing that land distribution itself explains violence, and not other 
variables associated with land distribution (such as poverty and rurality, as shown 
in the quintile table, Table 9).  Without controlling for poverty or rurality, it is not 
clear that the significance of the Gini in the violence regression is due to an 
intrinsic characteristic of land distribution. 
 
Using data supplied by the Centro de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo Económico 
(CEDE) at the Universidad de los Andes, the regressions explaining violence are 
estimated using a Tobit, as suggested by Wooldridge (2002) given the data 
structure.   The results are divided into groups according to the dependent variable, 
where each table contains models to estimate the average, total and most recent 
year of data.  The violence variables estimated are number kidnappings, number of 
massacre victims, and number of guerrilla actions (FARC and ELN combined).   
Each table follows the same sequence.  For each variable, first the same violence   25
regressions discussed above are run, and then the additional explanatory variables 
are included.  The unconditional marginal effects E(y|x) evaluated at the mean 
values are also reported.   
 
The regressions in Table 11, Table 12 and Table 13 show several patterns 
consistent throughout the data, for all violence measures.  First, as may be 
expected, the averages are best explained by the independent variables 
characterizing the municipalities.  Second, in general the results indicate that land 
Gini is not a significant factor in explaining municipal violence levels.
7  Third, in all 
cases the regressions that include additional variables to capture aspects of 
poverty and rurality perform better in terms of pseudo R
2 and likelihood ratio tests 
than their restricted counterparts.  Finally, the most important factor throughout all 
of the regressions, in terms of marginal effect and significance, is area of coca 
cultivated.  All types of violence increase with the presence of coca.   
 
Generally, violence appears to be greater in municipalities with higher population 
density, more kilometers of roads and a smaller percentage of the population 
outside the municipal head.  The effect of distance to the capital Bogotá is 
ambiguous.  In the total and average kidnappings regressions, land Gini loses 
significance after the inclusion of variables that more directly measure poverty.   
This suggests, as mentioned above, that land Gini alone captures aspects of 
poverty and rurality.  Once accounting for these effects, distribution itself does not 
appear to play a significant role in determining kidnapping levels. 
 
                                                 
7 In regressions where the dependent violence variable is transformed into per capita values (not 
reported), the land Gini coefficient is not significant either.   26
Even though in the 1999 kidnapping and 2000 attack regressions the land Gini is 
positive and significant, the single year data for both variables has a large number 
of zero observations and the pseudo-R
2 is considerably lower than the average 
and total regressions.  The overall results suggest that land distribution does not 
play an important role in determining violence measures at the municipal level, and 




Calculating the Gini at the national, departmental and municipal level in Colombia 
using plot level information from the 2002 IGAC cadastre data shows that land 
distribution shifts depending on data filtration and geographical universe.  In 
addition, the cadastre data allows for the calculation of land value Ginis to account 
for land quality in the distribution measure. 
 
The national, departmental and municipal land size and land value Ginis reveal 
that accounting for land quality does reduce the inequality measure.  After 
meticulous data filtration to eliminate state-owned plots, tribal reserves and non-
rural land, the national Gini drops below earlier estimates.  More detailed analysis 
at the departmental and municipal levels reveals that the percent of total area 
included in the Gini calculation affects the land distribution measure, and even 
though the data has been filtered, errors in the cadastre remain.  These errors 
include plot size and plot value.  At all three levels calculated Gini coefficients 
should be taken as an upper bound because plots owned by multiple individuals 
are treated as singly-owned plots, and the plot-level data reveals that the largest 
plots are more likely to have multiple owners.  Ginis also may be affected by the 
actualization year of the cadastre due to unreported land transactions and outdated 
value assessments.     27
 
Overall, the national and departmental Ginis are likely less reliable due to problems 
with the creation, actualization and maintenance of the cadastral data.  Problems 
include measurement error at the plot level, differing municipal valuation criteria, 
and systematic data errors.  The detailed plot-level data contained in the 2002 
IGAC cadastre database allows for deeper analysis at the municipal level where 
data characteristics may be more homogeneous.   
 
Although higher poverty levels and lower growth rates have been associated with 
higher inequality, the Colombian municipal level data reveal a negative relationship 
between poverty and land distribution.  For Colombia, it appears that municipalities 
that are more rural and have more people living in conditions of poverty actually 
present lower land size and land value Gini coefficients.  Further study is needed in 
order to understand the complexities of this relationship and how the role of land 
titling programs, land reform or historical context may explain this result. 
 
Using a simple reduced form equation to explain the municipal land size and value 
Ginis, the results demonstrate a negative relationship between inequality, poverty 
and rurality.  This confirms the direction of the relationship identified in the analysis 
of Ginis by quintiles.  A negative and significant coefficient on the NBI difference in 
both the land and value regressions suggests that the municipalities that have 
made progress in reducing the NBI are those with higher land inequality. 
 
Given earlier results that explain violence levels with land distribution, the same 
reduced form regressions are constructed, and controls for poverty, rurality and 
criminality are added.  Including poverty and rurality variables along with the Gini is 
fundamental in controlling for these other factors and establishing that land 
distribution itself explains violence, and not other municipal characteristics that Gini   28
may capture.  In general, violence appears to be greater in municipalities with 
higher population density, more kilometers of roads and a smaller percentage of 
the population outside the municipal head, while land Gini is not significant.  This 
suggests that land Gini alone in the regression captures aspects of poverty and 
rurality, and after accounting for these effects the land distribution does not appear 
to play a significant role in determining violence levels. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Gini filtration definition 
Filter  Gini land 
area 
Gini land 
value  Description 
1  All plots  92.69  82.99  Raw data as supplied by IGAC 
2  Ag. and rural only  91.05  81.94  Elimination of non-rural and non-agricultural plots 
3 Private  only  87.78  81.66  Elimination of state owned plots 
4 Final  filtered  85.46  81.02  Elimination of indian reserves, public lands, and 
other non-rural and non-ag properties 
5 Across  owners  85.38  81.63  Summing property across owners 
6 No  outliers  85.08  80.99 
Elimination of properties whose value is less than 
1 centavo per hectare or greater than $10 million 
pesos per square meter 
 
 



























Decile  635.5 77.80%  50.30% 41.4 344,074 10.70% 227,776 10% 1.51 
















   33
Table 3 Departmental Ginis 












(% of total) 
Antioquia -  -  -  -  - 
Atlantico 72.25  79.33  -7.07  24.25  10.62 
Bogota D.C.  -  -  -  -  - 
Bolivar 70.21  75.51  -5.30  55.89  67.91 
Boyaca 78.91  73.10  5.80  76.92  78.44 
Caldas 80.45  78.84  1.60  57.80  86.48 
Caqueta 50.54  69.52  -18.98  67.97  15.45 
Cauca 80.91  83.12  -2.21  78.32  42.03 
Cesar 65.25  74.42  -9.18  50.32  73.43 
Cordoba 74.83  75.51  -0.68  64.03  85.48 
Cundinamarca 76.63  79.61  -2.99  68.25  91.28 
Choco 79.88  76.08  3.80  71.32  4.64 
Huila 76.39  72.20  4.19  60.03  61.90 
La Guajira  67.14  73.58  -6.45  34.01  21.95 
Magdalena 68.75  70.84  -2.09  56.88  76.27 
Meta 86.16  78.19  7.96  63.25  56.26 
Narino 78.76  73.46  5.30  76.49  30.65 
Norte de Santander  69.73  69.97  -0.23  64.85  55.66 
Quindio 78.94  67.52  11.42  37.78  93.24 
Risaralda 77.16  79.60  -2.44  51.56  68.76 
Santander 77.41  75.29  2.11  72.29  87.09 
Sucre 77.34  76.64  0.70  46.35  80.61 
Tolima 76.78  77.02  -0.24  58.66  81.87 
Valle del Cauca  83.07  84.57  -1.50  44.59  54.01 
Arauca 83.29  67.89  15.40  53.91  80.57 
Casanare 80.95  75.93  5.02  66.65  62.52 
Putumayo 73.97  69.86  4.11  67.41  7.59 
San Andres  65.64  66.62  -0.99  45.76  - 
Amazonas -  -  -  - - 
Guainia 24.64  40.90  -16.26  96.94  0.004 
Guaviare 43.20  59.75  -16.55  79.68  2.11 
Vaupes -  -  -  -  - 
Vichada 41.96  56.01  -14.05  80.73  14.11 
Average 71.07  72.44  -1.37  61.13  55.22 
Average > 25% land  77.09  75.46  1.63  60.24  70.72 
Average > 50% land  76.79  75.15  1.64  58.33  74.54 
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Figure 1 Municipal Gini histogram 














































Table 4 Ten highest municipal land Ginis 
Municipality Department 






capital  (%) 









Mosquera Narino  66.22  73.50 680  706  98.36  86.43  77.55 
Bahia Solano   Choco  47.76  65.11  657  706  97.48  83.24  77.42 
Guican Boyaca  38.03  84.14  719  1292  96.91  96.99  63.71 
Candelaria Valle  48.22  68.62 1544  2353  91.62  91.60  89.59 
Paez Cauca 34.94  89.99  644  759  91.37  91.37  85.06 
Villamaria Caldas  74.17  28.77  2803  4327  90.75  90.75  72.44 
Palmira Valle  59.64  17.19  5426  7548  90.62  90.60  90.36 
Giron Santander  64.37  11.85 4582  6329  90.45  90.45  80.19 
Mallama Narino  87.50 92.54  2938  4250  90.30  90.29  70.58 
Puerto 
Colombia  Atlantico 10.95  42.60  188  250  90.15  90.15  86.57 
Average     53.18 57.43  2018.10 2852.0 92.80 90.19 79.35 
 
   35
Table 5 Highest land representation 
Municipality Department 
Plot area / 
municipal 
area (%) 
Gini land  Gini 
value 
Santa 
Rosalia  Vichada 2899.32  50.17  62.84 
Cravo Norte  Arauca  1691.72  63.65  59.78 
Cordoba Bolivar  674.31  69.36  70.65 
Pasca Cundinamarca  586.46 69.06  56.00 
Solita Caqueta  345.98  34.48  42.56 
Florian Santander  314.21 52.64  57.84 
Paez Boyaca  288.41  89.41  55.81 
Santamaria Boyaca  269.03  62.45  57.33 
Guayata Boyaca  212.13  80.65  77.43 
Matanza Santander  202.93  68.14  56.59 





Table 6 National, departmental and municipal Ginis 
Unfiltered Filtered  Owners  Gini 
Land Value Land Value Land Value 
National  92.69 82.99 85.46  81.017  85.378  81.627 
Department 
(Average)  82.33 77.60 71.07 72.44 72.03 73.75 
Municipal 
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1984 836  1975.1  8.9  5.56  1949 
1985 839  1975.8  9.2  6.19  1949 
1986 839  1976  10  6.27  1949 
1987 839  1976.3  10.7  6.5  1949 
1988 841  1977  11  7.26  1949 
1989 843  1977.9  11.1  7.6  1949 
1990 843  1979.6  10.4  8.31  1949 
1991 847  1982.1  8.9  8.99  1949 
1992 846  1984.1  7.9  9.11  1949 
1993 850  1986.7  6.3  8.56  1949 
1994 853  1989  5  7.69  1954 
1995 859  1990  5  7.59  1954 
1996 863  1991.2  4.8  7.41  1954 
1997 865  1991.7  5.3  7.38  1954 
1998 872  1992.8  5.2  7.79  1954 
1999 887  1993.3  5.7  7.54  1954 
2000 887  1993.6  6.4  7.52  1954 
2001 902  1993.8  7.2  7.57  1954 
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Figure 2 Actualization and land Gini 


































































































2002 39 72.60 1.33 
1998 129 67.46  0.94*** 
1996 118 68.47  0.78*** 
1994 129 69.50 0.93* 
1993 105 68.44  0.88*** 
1992 43 69.80 1.40 
*** Significant 1% 
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Table 9 Land and value Ginis by quintiles  
 
1 2 3 4 5 t-stat 1 2 3 4 5 t-stat
Gini 55.29 64.43 69.74 74.88 82.44 -47.14 55.18 61.79 66.57 72.03 80.43 -58.00
Observations 133 133 133 133 133 - 133 133 133 133 133 -
Municipal characteristics
Distance to Bogotá (km.) 12.67 4.04 17.80 -5.26 -29.25 4.10 19.88 8.64 -9.47 -2.27 -16.78 3.16
Distance to principal markets (km.) 36.35 18.57 -0.79 -27.06 -27.07 3.51 -20.18 1.92 14.66 11.06 -7.46 -0.83
Road density (km.), 1995  -183.57 -140.84 -34.51 113.31 245.61 -4.23 -273.77 -213.39 -44.84 213.22 318.78 -5.85
Professors in municipal head per 10,000 -0.04 0.18 -0.42 0.57 -0.29 0.70 0.30 -0.61 -0.22 0.73 -0.20 1.43
Health centers and hospitals per 10,000 -0.08 -0.06 0.06 0.08 0.00 -1.28 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.01
Area included/total municipal area (%) -5.78 -1.32 6.15 3.59 -2.64 -0.68 5.51 -3.13 1.05 -0.52 -2.91 1.39
Value urban plots (1,000 pesos), 2000  -807.57 -993.47 -760.20 -144.71 2705.96 -3.17 -1520.66 -579.99 -776.19 613.95 2262.89 -5.19
Value rural plots (1,000,000 pesos), 2000 -3.25 -1.96 -1.51 0.87 5.85 -4.31 -5.77 -4.83 -1.50 2.32 9.78 -7.69
Invest. spend. (free+forced, 1,000 pesos), 2000 per cap 16.82 24.09 -15.14 5.25 -31.02 3.22 31.35 -0.65 -20.28 -6.02 -4.40 1.46
Investment spending, % free, 2000 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 5.13 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 6.55
Violence
Actions FARC, average 1985-2000 per capita 1.53 0.56 -1.00 -0.43 -0.65 2.97 1.71 0.08 -0.73 0.19 -1.25 3.49
Actions ELN, average 1985-2000 per capita 15.70 -7.06 -2.40 -0.72 -5.52 2.20 11.04 4.46 -2.68 -6.00 -6.82 2.08
Kidnappings, average 1993-1999 per capita 0.72 0.52 0.09 -0.25 -1.09 1.76 0.32 -0.03 -0.64 0.73 -0.38 0.68
Poverty
Persons rural NBI  (%), 1993 4.95 3.95 0.56 -3.33 -6.12 5.23 1.04 2.01 1.02 0.43 -4.51 2.75
Persons in misery, rural (%), 1993 4.55 3.35 -0.07 -2.37 -5.47 5.49 0.09 1.75 0.61 0.12 -2.57 1.51
Non-muni head with water service (%), 1993 -11.51 -3.72 -1.90 5.66 11.49 -7.88 -9.75 -2.93 1.78 3.85 7.06 -6.04
Non-muni head with sewage service (%), 1993 -7.20 -4.11 -0.90 4.68 7.52 -7.73 -6.63 -2.52 2.35 2.14 4.66 -6.03
Non-muni head with phone service (%), 1993 -0.81 -1.06 -0.83 0.81 1.89 -4.74 -1.05 -0.97 0.32 0.26 1.44 -4.86
Poverty factor 0.39 0.20 0.02 -0.15 -0.46 7.75 0.20 0.19 0.03 -0.10 -0.33 4.80
Population
Population (10,000) -0.77 -0.71 -1.35 -0.18 3.01 -2.66 -1.88 -1.57 -0.87 0.57 3.75 -4.02
Population ratio non-muni head/total (%) 8.01 3.22 3.55 -3.34 -11.43 6.14 13.82 8.48 0.84 -6.18 -16.97 11.31





Note: NBI is Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas, a measure of the percent of the population that cannot satisfy basic needs 
Spending is free and forced, where free is determined at the municipal level and forced by federal law. 
 
 Table 10 Land and value Gini regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance to Bogotá (100 km) -0.831 -1.269 -0.709 -0.81 -0.833 -1.231 -0.669 -0.8
[2.53]* [3.65]** [2.20]* [2.47]* [2.43]* [3.39]** [1.98]* [2.35]*
Distance to principal markets (100 km) -1.97 -1.906 -1.803 -1.779 -1.743 -1.649 -1.518 -1.44
[5.17]** [5.01]** [4.58]** [4.62]** [4.89]** [4.61]** [4.10]** [3.96]**
Altitude (1,000 m) -0.788 -0.873 -0.574 -0.631 -2.589 -2.649 -2.431 -2.341
[1.51] [1.61] [1.09] [1.21] [5.24]** [5.17]** [4.96]** [4.78]**
Municipal area (1,000 km2) 0.85 0.838 0.12 0.817 0.568 0.529 -0.08 0.516
[1.85]+ [1.71]+ [0.28] [1.77]+ [1.26] [1.16] [0.13] [1.11]
Roads (1,000 km), 1995 0.019 0.017
[4.05]** [2.92]**
ELN av 1985-2000 per cap 0.00 -0.007
[0.02] [1.60]
Rural plot value (millions of pesos), 2000 0.061 0.096
[3.14]** [3.42]**
Households NBI 1973 -0.227 -0.199 -0.199 -0.223 -0.194 -0.178
[6.94]** [5.86]** [5.89]** [7.32]** [6.17]** [5.40]**
NBI 1985-1973 difference -0.165 -0.177
[4.42]** [5.17]**
Dummy Caribe region 6.415 7.71 5.347 6.463 3.81 5.016 2.391 3.886
[3.56]** [4.24]** [2.87]** [3.61]** [2.39]* [3.03]** [1.43] [2.39]*
Dummy Andina region 4.326 5.9 4.203 5.266 -1.2 0.145 -1.55 0.287
[2.51]* [3.40]** [2.49]* [3.01]** [0.77] [0.09] [0.99] [0.18]
Dummy Pacifica region 11.415 13.408 10.993 12.026 6.254 8.015 5.507 7.221
[6.44]** [7.63]** [6.20]** [6.78]** [3.75]** [4.74]** [3.27]** [4.33]**
Constant 90.912 67.792 87.021 86.388 94.386 71.453 90.892 87.229
[26.95]** [26.78]** [24.35]** [23.24]** [30.95]** [32.38]** [28.22]** [23.80]**
Observations 724 720 724 724 724 720 724 724
Adjusted R-squared 0.214 0.174 0.23 0.222 0.248 0.22 0.263 0.271
Land Gini Value Gini
 
Robust t statistics in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 11 Tobit kidnapping regressions 
Model (1) (3) (5)
Tobit Tobit E(y|x) Tobit Tobit E(y|x) Tobit Tobit E(y|x)
Land Gini 16.214 4.88 2.837 2.316 0.697 0.405 14.07 12.665 4.481
[1.71]+ [0.52] [0.52] [1.71]+ [0.52] [0.52] [2.61]** [2.09]* [2.09]*
Population density 23.537 18.151 10.554 3.362 2.593 1.508 10.577 8.016 2.836
[9.81]** [7.53]** [7.53]** [9.81]** [7.53]** [7.53]** [8.03]** [5.87]** [5.87]**
Distance to Bogotá -22.072 -16.775 -9.753 -3.153 -2.396 -1.393 -11.208 -6.252 -2.212
[2.60]** [2.00]* [2.00]* [2.60]** [2.00]* [2.00]* [2.39]* [1.21] [1.21]
Road density 8.81 7.713 4.485 1.259 1.102 0.641 3.152 2.389 0.845
[9.03]** [8.19]** [8.19]** [9.03]** [8.19]** [8.19]** [6.04]** [4.47]** [4.47]**
Coca, total 1999 m2 49.669 28.879 7.096 4.126 -0.008 -0.003
[3.49]** [3.49]** [3.49]** [3.49]** [0.08] [0.08]
Rural/Total population (%) -0.316 -0.184 -0.045 -0.026 21.241 7.516
[6.85]** [6.85]** [6.85]** [6.85]** [2.70]** [2.70]**
NBI, 1993 0.058 0.034 0.008 0.005 -0.131 -0.046
[0.83] [0.83] [0.83] [0.83] [4.04]** [4.04]**
Constant -2.947 19.105 11.108 -0.421 2.729 1.587 -13.629 5.082 1.798
[0.25] [1.50] [1.50] [0.25] [1.50] [1.50] [1.85]+ [0.46] [0.46]
Observations 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 766 766
Log Likelihood -2934.4 -2901.13 -1729.88 -1696.62 -1599.12 -1457.7
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08
Tot. kidnpngs, 1993-99 Av. kidnpngs, 1993-99 Kidnpngs, 1999
(2) (4) (6)
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; absolute value of z statistics in brackets for unconditional values 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Departmental dummies included but not reported 
Table 12 Tobit massacre regressions 
Model (1) (3) (5)
Tobit Tobit E(y|x) Tobit Tobit E(y|x) Tobit Tobit E(y|x)
Land Gini 9.07 9.97 2.378 1.296 1.424 0.34 17.783 13.334 0.54
[0.77] [0.85] [0.85] [0.77] [0.85] [0.85] [1.36] [1.03] [1.03]
Population density 10.49 7.918 1.889 1.499 1.131 0.27 5.902 3.439 0.139
[4.06]** [3.11]** [3.11]** [4.06]** [3.11]** [3.11]** [2.12]* [1.32] [1.32]
Distance to Bogotá -20.223 -21.643 -5.163 -2.889 -3.092 -0.738 -23.434 -21.175 -0.858
[1.97]* [2.12]* [2.12]* [1.97]* [2.12]* [2.12]* [2.03]* [1.87]+ [1.87]+
Road density 7.181 6.362 1.518 1.026 0.909 0.217 3.465 2.741 0.111
[6.83]** [6.32]** [6.32]** [6.83]** [6.32]** [6.32]** [3.44]** [2.82]** [2.82]**
Coca, total 1999-2001 m2 27.591 6.582 3.942 0.94 14.688 0.595
[5.14]** [5.14]** [5.14]** [5.14]** [3.02]** [3.02]**
Rural/Total population (%) -0.164 -0.039 -0.023 -0.006 -0.156 -0.006
[3.02]** [3.02]** [3.02]** [3.02]** [2.73]** [2.73]**
NBI, 1993 0.082 0.02 0.012 0.003 0.067 0.003
[0.96] [0.96] [0.96] [0.96] [0.74] [0.74]
Constant -10.589 -12.864 -3.069 -1.513 -1.838 -0.438 -18.263 -15.044 -0.609
[0.82] [0.93] [0.93] [0.82] [0.93] [0.93] [1.54] [1.13] [1.13]
Observations 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880
Log Likelihood -1406.43 -1387.18 -890.76 -871.52 -481.60 -472.65
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11
Massac. victims, tot. 1995-2001 Massac. victims, av. 1995-2001 Massacre victims, 2001
(2) (4) (6)
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; absolute value of z statistics in brackets for unconditional values 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 13 Tobit FARC and ELN attack regressions 
Model (1) (3) (5)
Tobit Tobit E(y|x) Tobit Tobit E(y|x) Tobit Tobit E(y|x)
Land Gini -8.66 -7.997 -4.934 -0.271 -0.250 -0.154 7.729 9.307 3.423
[0.70] [0.64] [0.64] [0.70] [0.64] [0.64] [1.65]+ [1.94]+ [1.94]+
Population density 9.56 7.421 4.579 0.299 0.232 0.143 2.862 2.794 1.028
[2.89]** [2.18]* [2.18]* [2.89]** [2.18]* [2.18]* [2.11]* [1.97]* [1.97]*
Distance to Bogotá 2.27 -4.012 -2.475 0.071 -0.125 -0.077 -1.728 -3.876 -1.425
[0.20] [0.36] [0.36] [0.20] [0.36] [0.36] [0.43] [0.94] [0.94]
Road density 8.948 8.021 4.949 0.28 0.251 0.155 1.942 1.795 0.66
[6.74]** [6.10]** [6.10]** [6.74]** [6.10]** [6.10]** [4.13]** [3.82]** [3.82]**
Coca, total 1999-2000 m2 36.04 22.236 1.126 0.695 8.739 3.214
[3.92]** [3.92]** [3.92]** [3.92]** [2.85]** [2.85]**
Rural/Total population (%) -0.243 -0.15 -0.008 -0.005 -0.03 -0.011
[3.78]** [3.78]** [3.78]** [3.78]** [1.26] [1.26]
NBI, 1993 0.252 0.155 0.008 0.005 0.061 0.022
[2.66]** [2.66]** [2.66]** [2.66]** [1.72]+ [1.72]+
Constant 9.453 1.567 0.967 0.295 0.049 0.03 -2.942 -7.546 -2.775
[0.61] [0.09] [0.09] [0.61] [0.09] [0.09] [0.55] [1.24] [1.24]
Observations 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880
Log Likelihood -3444.79 -3428.90 -1039.57 -1023.68 -1637.00 -1630.93
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.07
Total attacks, 1985-2000 Average attacks, 1985-2000 Attacks 2000
(2) (4) (6)
 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; absolute value of z statistics in brackets for unconditional values 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Departmental dummies included but not reported; Attacks are FARC and ELN only 
 
 